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Abstract
This paper gives two examples to break through the revelation principle. Furthermore, the
revenue equivalence theorem does not hold.
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1 Introduction
Recently, several papers on quantum mechanism have generalized the traditional
framework of mechanism design theory, not only in the quantum world, but also
in the real world [1,2]. Moreover, Ref. [3] claims that the well-known revelation
principle may not hold by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism.
In the rest of this paper, I will consider two formats of auctions (i.e, first-price
sealed-bid procurement auction and first-price sealed-bid auction) respectively, and
give two examples to break through the revelation principle. Furthermore, I will
show that the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold.
2 First-price sealed-bid procurement auction
According to Example 2.30 and Example 2.37 in Ref. [4], consider a first-price
sealed-bid procurement auction of a single indivisible resource with one buyer (call
the agent 0) and two sellers (call them agent 1 and 2). Both sellers’ privately ob-
served valuations θi (i = 1, 2) are drawn independently from the uniform distri-
bution on [0, 1]. This fact is common knowledge among the agents. Each seller
submits a sealed bid, bi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2). The sealed bids are examined and the seller
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with the lower bid is declared the winner. If there is a tie, seller 1 is declared the
winner. The winning seller receives an amount equal to his bid from the buyer. The
losing seller does not receive anything.
Consider the social choice function SCF-PROC3 (page 58, [4]) which is described
as follows: f (θ) = (y0(θ), y1(θ), y2(θ), t0(θ), t1(θ), t2(θ)),
y1(θ) = 1, if θ1 ≤ θ2; = 0 else;
y2(θ) = 1, if θ1 > θ2; = 0 else;
y0(θ) = 0, for all θ;
t1(θ) =
1 + θ1
2
y1(θ);
t2(θ) =
1 + θ2
2
y2(θ);
t0(θ) = −(t1(θ) + t2(θ)).
According to Example 2.37 (page 66, [4]), the strategies bi(θi) = (1 + θi)/2 (for
i = 1, 2) constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this auction that indirectly yields
the outcomes specified by f (θ). Thus, according to Proposition 9 and 10 [5], f is
incentive compatible and Bayesian monotonic. Since the two sellers are symmetric,
according to the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity [3], f is multi-Bayesian
monotonic.
In order to obtain more profits, it is beneficial for two sellers to both increase their
bids. A possible deception is αi(θi) =
√
θi (i = 1, 2). If both sellers choose this
deception, α(θ) ≡ (α1(θ1), α2(θ2)) = (
√
θ1,
√
θ2). Let h(θ) ≡ [ f ◦ α](θ), then h(θ) =
f (α(θ)) = (z0(θ), z1(θ), z2(θ), r0(θ), r1(θ), r2(θ)):
z1(θ) = 1, if θ1 ≤ θ2; = 0 else;
z2(θ) = 1, if θ1 > θ2; = 0 else;
z0(θ) = 0, for all θ;
r1(θ) =
1 +
√
θ1
2
z1(θ);
r2(θ) =
1 +
√
θ2
2
z2(θ);
r0(θ) = −(r1(θ) + r2(θ)).
For each seller i (i = 1, 2), he faces two strategies (denoted as C and D): strategy C
means seller i uses the deception αi(θi) =
√
θi, and strategy D means seller i does
not deceive. Consider the expected payoff of seller 2, we denote by $CC the expected
payoff when each agent i choose the deception αi, and denote by $CD the expected
payoff when agent 1 chooses the deception α1 and agent 2 does not deceive. $DD
2
and $DC are defined similarly.
$DD = E[
1 + θ2
2
− θ2]y2(θ1, θ2) = (1 − θ2)2/2,
$CC = E[
1 +
√
θ2
2
− θ2]y2(
√
θ1,
√
θ2) = [
1 +
√
θ2
2
− θ2](1 − θ2),
$DC = E[
1 +
√
θ2
2
− θ2]y2(θ1,
√
θ2) = [
1 +
√
θ2
2
− θ2](1 −
√
θ2).
Since θ1, θ2 ∈ [0, 1], then $CC > $DD, $CC > $DC. Thus, condition λBpi/2 is satis-
fied for seller 2. Similarly, condition λBpi/2 is also satisfied for seller 1. By using
the algorithmic Bayesian mechanism [3], h can be implemented in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Note that h is not incentive compatible (since f is incentive compati-
ble), so the revelation principle does not hold for this auction.
3 First-price sealed-bid auction
According to Example 23.B.5 in Ref. [6], consider an auction setting with one seller
(i.e., agent 0) and two buyers (i.e., agent 1 and 2). Both buyers’ privately observed
valuations θi are drawn independently from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and
this fact is common knowledge among the agents. Each buyer submits a sealed bid,
bi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2). The sealed bids are examined and the buyer with the higher bid
is declared the winner. If there is a tie, buyer 1 is declared the winner. The winning
seller pays an amount equal to his bid to the seller. The losing buyer does not pay
anything.
Consider the social choice function f ′(θ) = (y′0(θ), y
′
1(θ), y
′
2(θ), t
′
0(θ), t
′
1(θ), t
′
2(θ)), in
which
y′1(θ) = 1, if θ1 ≥ θ2; = 0 else;
y′2(θ) = 1, if θ1 < θ2; = 0 else;
y′0(θ) = 0, for all θ;
t′1(θ) = −
1
2
θ1y′1(θ);
t′2(θ) = −
1
2
θ2y′2(θ);
t′0(θ) = −(t′1(θ) + t′2(θ)).
As specified in Example 23.B.5, the strategies bi(θi) = θi/2 (for i = 1, 2) consti-
tute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this auction that indirectly yields the outcomes
specified by f ′(θ). Thus, according to Proposition 9 and 10 [5], f ′ is incentive
compatible and Bayesian monotonic. Since the two buyer are symmetric, then ac-
cording to the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity [3], f ′ is multi-Bayesian
monotonic.
3
In order to obtain more profits, it is beneficial for two buyers to both decrease
their bids. A possible deception is αi(θi) = θ2i (i = 1, 2). If both buyers choose
this deception, α′(θ) ≡ (α′1(θ1), α′2(θ2)) = (θ21, θ22). Let h′(θ) ≡ [ f ′ ◦ α′](θ), then
h′(θ) = f ′(α′(θ)) = (z′0(θ), z
′
1(θ), z
′
2(θ), r
′
0(θ), r
′
1(θ), r
′
2(θ)):
z′1(θ) = 1, if θ1 ≥ θ2; = 0 else;
z′2(θ) = 1, if θ1 < θ2; = 0 else;
z′0(θ) = 0, for all θ;
r′1(θ) = −
1
2
θ21z
′
1(θ);
r′2(θ) = −
1
2
θ22z
′
2(θ);
r′0(θ) = −(r′1(θ) + r′2(θ)).
For each buyer i (i = 1, 2), he faces two strategies (denoted as C and D): strategy
C means buyer i uses the deception α′i(θi) = θ
2
i , and strategy D means buyer i does
not deceive. Consider the expected payoff of buyer 2,
$DD = E[θ2 − θ22 ]y
′
2(θ1, θ2) = [θ2 −
θ2
2
]θ2,
$CC = E[θ2 −
θ22
2
]y′2(θ
2
1, θ
2
2) = [θ2 −
θ22
2
]θ2,
$DC = E[θ2 −
θ22
2
]y′2(θ1, θ
2
2) = [θ2 −
θ22
2
]θ22.
Obviously, $CC > $DD, $CC > $DC. Thus, condition λBpi/2 is satisfied for buyer 2.
Similarly, condition λBpi/2 is also satisfied for buyer 1. By using the algorithmic
Bayesian mechanism [3], h′ can be implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Note that h′ is not incentive compatible (since f ′ is incentive compatible), so the
revelation principle does not hold for this auction.
4 Breaking through the revenue equivalence theorem
Here I cite Proposition 23.D.3 from Ref. [6].
Proposition 23.D.3: (The Revenue Equivalence Theorem) Consider an auction set-
ting with I risk-neutral buyers, in which buyer i’s valuation is drawn from an in-
terval [θi, θi] with θi , θi and a strictly positive density φi(·) > 0, and in which
buyers’ types are statistically independent. Suppose that a given pair of Bayesian
Nash equilibria of two different auction procedures are such that for every buyer i:
(i) For each possible realization of (θ1, · · · , θI), buyer i has an identical probability
of getting the good in the two auctions; and (ii) Buyer i has the same expected utility
level in the two auctions when his valuation for the object is at its lowest possible
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level. Then these equilibria of the two auctions generate the same expected revenue
for the seller.
Obviously, for i = 0, 1, 2, z′i(θ) = y
′
i(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], and r′1(0, 0) =
t′1(0, 0) = 0, r
′
2(0, 0) = t
′
2(0, 0) = 0. Since r
′
i (θ) > t
′
i (θ) for any θ ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1)
(i = 1, 2), the deception α′ does decrease the expected revenue for the seller. So the
revenue equivalence theorem does not hold.
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